Banking & Capital Markets

Industry Summary

High-value targets for financial crime, espionage, and insider data abuse
Must comply with GLBA, PCI DSS, GDPR, and cross-border regulatory frameworks
Operate hybrid environments spanning core banking, payments, lending, and analytics
Threat actors include APTs (espionage), FIN groups (ransomware, data theft), and insiders
Attack tactics commonly involve phishing, credential abuse, lateral movement, and cloud misconfiguration

1. Protect KYC and Onboarding Documents

Problem
Banks collect sensitive documents (IDs, proof-of-income, biometrics) during KYC and onboarding that are stored and shared across systems.

Data in Scope
PII, SPI (e.g., full name, SSN, passport number, income documents, facial biometrics)

Ubiq Controls Applied
Encrypt all document uploads at the field and file level. Tokenize IDs to preserve referential integrity across CRM, AML, and scoring tools.

IAM / Access Policy Logic
Only onboarding staff and regulated compliance roles may decrypt or detokenize identity fields.

Outcome / Impact
Improved regulatory compliance with GLBA and GDPR while enabling identity reuse across systems.

Threat Type
Data Theft / Espionage — APT and FIN actors (e.g., APT41, FIN11) conduct targeted phishing or credential-harvesting campaigns to steal onboarding datasets containing personal and biometric data. Objectives include financial fraud and intelligence collection; tactics include phishing, privilege escalation, and data exfiltration over HTTPS or cloud storage.

2. Secure Core Account and Ledger Data

Problem
Account numbers, balances, and customer identifiers stored in core banking systems are frequent breach targets.

Data in Scope
PII, Financial (e.g., account number, IBAN, balance history, customer ID)

Ubiq Controls Applied
Apply field-level encryption to all sensitive account fields. Use dynamic masking for internal dashboards and partial masking in logs.

IAM / Access Policy Logic
Only core transaction processors and auditors may decrypt account numbers in production.

Outcome / Impact
Reduced insider risk and exposure in backups, replicas, and downstream extracts.

Threat Type
Data Exfiltration — FIN groups (e.g., FIN7, FIN8) and insiders target core banking databases to extract financial data for wire fraud, carding, or account takeovers. Common attack vectors include credential stuffing, SQL injection, and living-off-the-land techniques for lateral movement and silent extraction.

3. Tokenize Card Data and Transaction Streams

Problem
Payment card data must be protected at every point in the transaction lifecycle to meet PCI DSS and limit breach impact.

Data in Scope
Payments, PII (e.g., PAN, CVV, expiration date, transaction timestamps)

Ubiq Controls Applied
Tokenize PAN and CVV in databases and event streams. Apply dynamic masking to show only last-four digits in customer service portals.

IAM / Access Policy Logic
Only PCI-cleared systems may detokenize PANs; support staff see masked values only.

Outcome / Impact
Reduced PCI DSS scope and limited exposure during support, logging, and analytics.

Threat Type
Financially Motivated Intrusion — FIN and UNC groups (e.g., FIN13, UNC2891) use malware injection, phishing, and supply chain compromise of payment processors to steal card data. Typical tactics include memory scraping, exfiltration via C2 tunnels, and credential abuse on payment APIs.

4. Encrypt Wire Transfers and Cross-Border Payment Data

Problem
SWIFT messages and correspondent bank details are vulnerable in multi-hop payment flows.

Data in Scope
Financial, PII (e.g., SWIFT codes, routing numbers, sender/recipient names)

Ubiq Controls Applied
Encrypt full wire payloads, including sender/recipient names and bank IDs. Enforce audit logging for decryption events.

IAM / Access Policy Logic
Only payment operations teams and regulated auditors may decrypt SWIFT message data.

Outcome / Impact
Improved auditability and compliance with cross-border payment privacy requirements.

Threat Type
Supply Chain / Credential Abuse — Nation-state and FIN actors (APT38, FIN12) infiltrate SWIFT or interbank systems to manipulate wire queues and divert payments. Techniques include spear-phishing, domain credential reuse, and exploitation of trusted network connections between correspondent banks.

5. Mask Sensitive Fields in Loan Origination

Problem
Loan origination systems handle deeply sensitive borrower and property data shared across analysts and partners.

Data in Scope
PII, SPI, Financial (e.g., SSN, salary, loan amount, property valuation, tax forms)

Ubiq Controls Applied
Tokenize borrower IDs and income fields; apply static masking for third-party underwriters and non-prod environments.

IAM / Access Policy Logic
Only senior loan officers and fraud teams may unmask sensitive borrower data.

Outcome / Impact
Enabled partner collaboration while reducing data exposure risk during loan processing.

Threat Type
Insider Misuse / Third-Party Data Exposure — Contractors and partner systems are common attack surfaces. Threats include credential phishing and file exfiltration via shared storage. UNC and FIN groups often exploit weak partner networks for indirect access to customer data.

6. Pseudonymize Data for Credit and Fraud Analytics

Problem
Analytics platforms require large volumes of customer data, increasing exposure during modeling and risk scoring.

Data in Scope
PII, Financial, Behavioral (e.g., customer ID, account behavior, credit score, transaction anomalies)

Ubiq Controls Applied
Use pseudonymization to replace customer identifiers before ingest into cloud platforms. Enforce irreversible tokenization for model training.

IAM / Access Policy Logic
Data scientists and modelers access pseudonymized data only; decryption is blocked in analytics environments.

Outcome / Impact
Enabled secure analytics at scale without exposing real identities.

Threat Type
Cloud Data Exposure / Credential Abuse — FIN actors and access brokers exploit cloud misconfigurations and stolen service accounts to harvest data lakes. Techniques include API token theft, privilege escalation, and bulk exfiltration from analytics clusters.

7. Encrypt ATM and Branch Transaction Logs

Problem
ATM switch logs and branch transaction histories contain sensitive data replicated for reconciliation and fraud detection.

Data in Scope
PII, Financial (e.g., account number, ATM ID, transaction timestamp, location)

Ubiq Controls Applied
Encrypt transaction logs at record level. Mask account identifiers in operational tools and audit portals.

IAM / Access Policy Logic
Only fraud analysts and reconciliation systems may decrypt log data.

Outcome / Impact
Minimized breach impact and exposure from replicated or misconfigured log systems.

Threat Type
Infrastructure Compromise / Malware Injection — FIN and insider actors (e.g., FIN6, FIN8) deploy ATM malware or intercept transaction logs for fraud. Attack chain includes credential harvesting, lateral movement into ATM controllers, and log tampering for cash-out operations.

8. Apply Dynamic Masking in Customer Support Tools

Problem
Support staff need access to customer transaction data but should not see full card or account numbers.

Data in Scope
PII, Payments, Financial (e.g., account ID, transaction history, masked PANs)

Ubiq Controls Applied
Apply dynamic data masking at access time to redact full PANs and account IDs in support platforms.

IAM / Access Policy Logic
Only fraud investigation teams can unmask full data; support agents see masked views by default.

Outcome / Impact
Reduced insider risk and accidental exposure in high-volume support environments.

Threat Type
Insider Threat / Social Engineering — Insider misuse and external phishing actors exploit customer support roles for unauthorized data lookup or credential harvesting. Tactics include impersonation, session hijacking, and privilege escalation.

9. Protect Regulatory Reporting and Third-Party Sharing

Problem
Banks regularly transmit customer and account data to regulators, auditors, and bureaus.

Data in Scope
PII, Financial (e.g., customer ID, IBAN, credit score, audit logs)

Ubiq Controls Applied
Tokenize or encrypt sensitive fields prior to extract and transmission. Apply masking for recipients not requiring full detail.

IAM / Access Policy Logic
Only approved compliance staff can generate unmasked datasets; all external sharing occurs with masked or tokenized data.

Outcome / Impact
Met regulatory obligations without violating privacy laws or overexposing raw data.

Threat Type
Third-Party Breach / Supply Chain Exploitation — APT and FIN actors (e.g., UNC2546, FIN11) compromise external auditors, regulators, or law firms to harvest shared datasets. Common methods include spear-phishing, SFTP credential theft, and exploitation of unpatched partner systems.

10. Control Data Exposure in BI and Dashboard Tools

Problem
Banking teams use BI platforms (e.g., Power BI, Tableau) to visualize account, loan, and fraud data — often exposing raw identifiers in dashboards.

Data in Scope
PII, Financial, SPI (e.g., loan balances, delinquency flags, customer segmentation)

Ubiq Controls Applied
Tokenize sensitive fields in the analytics warehouse; apply dynamic masking to hide PII in dashboards unless explicitly authorized.

IAM / Access Policy Logic
Business users view masked dashboards by default; only risk and compliance teams may access detokenized views.

Outcome / Impact
Prevented data leakage through dashboards while enabling safe self-service analytics across business units.

Threat Type
Cloud Misconfiguration / Data Leakage — FIN and APT actors (e.g., FIN12, APT29) exploit exposed dashboards, misconfigured cloud storage, or stolen API tokens. Attack vectors include credential reuse, enumeration of unsecured endpoints, and API scraping for mass data extraction.