Comparison Matrix

The following matrix compares three approaches to securing sensitive data in Oracle Database environments. It evaluates the real-world effectiveness of each against insider threats, compromised credentials, and operational constraints.

Ubiq Security = Ubiq’s identity-driven encryption/tokenization platform (with native SQL Server integration assumed).
Microsoft Always Encrypted = SQL Server/Azure feature for client-side column-level encryption, keeping data encrypted in the database and only decrypted in the application driver.
SQL Server TDE = Transparent Data Encryption for SQL Server/Azure SQL DB, providing encryption at rest (database files and backups) at the storage level.

Security Dimension	Ubiq Security Platform (Identity-Driven Data Protection)	Microsoft Always Encrypted (Client-Side Column Encryption)	SQL Server TDE(Transparent Data Encryption)
Protection Against Internal Threats(malicious DBA or insider)	High: Data remains encrypted at the field/column level unless accessed by an authorized identity through Ubiq. Even database administrators cannot see plaintext without going through Ubiq’s IAM-governed decryption process. Encryption keys and logic are kept outside the database, so a rogue insider cannot retrieve sensitive data by querying the DB alone. Result: A DBA or server admin querying a protected table would only get ciphertext; Ubiq’s service must approve and provide keys for any decryption.	High: Designed specifically to prevent DB administrators from viewing sensitive data. Data in designated columns is always stored encrypted in the database, and decryption happens only in the client/application with the proper key. Even a sysadmin querying an Always Encrypted column sees only ciphertext. The SQL Server engine never has access to the plaintext or the decryption keys. (Note: This assumes the insider has access only to the database server, not the client app or key store.)	Low: Protects data at rest only. Once the database is running, any user with sufficient DB privileges (e.g. a DBA or application account with SELECT access) sees data in plaintext, because TDE decrypts data transparently for authorized queries. TDE assumes privileged users and DBAs are trusted, so it provides no barrier against a malicious insider reading sensitive records. A DBA can simply query an encrypted table and TDE will return cleartext, making it ineffective against insider abuse.
Protection Against External Credential Compromise(attacker using stolen DB/app credentials)	High: Ubiq ties decryption to identity and context external to the database. Stolen DB credentials alone are insufficient – an attacker would also need Ubiq authentication or keys. Even if they gain direct DB access, they only see encrypted gibberish for Ubiq-protected fields. Data access is enforced at runtime via IAM policies, so a hacker with a DB login cannot decrypt sensitive data without the proper Ubiq identity/token. Result: a breach of the database or a read-only account does not equate to a breach of the plaintext data.	High (for DB creds): If an attacker obtains database credentials or even compromises the SQL Server itself, they cannot decrypt Always Encrypted data without the keys. The database will return only ciphertext for protected columns. Stolen DB logins alone don’t help, since the encryption keys reside with the client (or in a separate key store). However, if the attacker also compromises the application or host that holds the keys (or the Azure Key Vault storing keys), they could decrypt data. In essence, Always Encrypted contains damage from DB credential theft, but if an attacker also steals the app/key credentials, the protection can be bypassed.	Low: TDE offers no special protection here. If an attacker gains valid DB credentials (or compromises an application service account), the database will decrypt data for them just as for any legitimate user. There is no additional check – any connection that passes SQL authentication/authorization gets plaintext. In practice, stolen DB credentials = stolen data with TDE, since encryption at rest doesn’t stop an active session from reading sensitive data.
Granularity of Access Control	Fine-Grained: Encryption/tokenization can be applied at a field or column level, with policies governing who (which role or identity) can decrypt each piece of data. Ubiq leverages the organization’s IAM to enforce field-level access rules in real time. For example, a manager’s token might decrypt a salary field, while a lower-level user sees it still encrypted or masked. Different users can get different views of the data based on policy. This per-identity, per-field control ensures true least-privilege data access.	Medium (Column-Level, not Identity-Aware): Always Encrypted works at the column level – you choose specific columns to encrypt. All data in that column is encrypted on disk and remains so in query results until the client driver decrypts it. This is more granular than whole-database encryption (you can encrypt only sensitive columns). However, access is not context- or role-specific: any application or user that has the decryption key can see the entire column’s plaintext. There’s no built-in ability to show different users different portions of the data – it’s an all-or-nothing per column (unless the application manages multiple keys and segregates data). In short, AE provides column-wise encryption but does not itself enforce user-by-user access distinctions beyond withholding the key.	Coarse (Database/File-Level): TDE operates at the database, tablespace, or file level – effectively encrypting everything at rest. Granularity is about what is encrypted on disk (you might encrypt an entire database or specific files), not about which user can see which data. Once decrypted for use, any user with access to that table sees the same plaintext. TDE cannot discriminate access at the row or column level – it’s a blanket encryption that is uniformly lifted for any authorized query. There is no per-user or per-column access nuance (aside from separately encrypting different columns on disk, which still doesn’t limit who sees them in the DB).
Runtime Enforcement(active, context-aware checks when data is accessed)	Yes – Context-Aware: Every access to protected data is checked at runtime against Ubiq’s external IAM-based policies. Ubiq’s approach is identity-driven: when an application or user requests decryption, Ubiq validates the identity, role, and context (e.g. permissions, session, perhaps device or time) at that moment before releasing a key or plaintext. This means even if someone has network or OS-level access to the database, they cannot bypass these runtime checks – the database never sees plaintext unless the requestor is validated. Enforcement is handled outside the DB (in Ubiq’s service), so it can’t be disabled or circumvented by tampering with database settings.	Yes – via Client Encryption Design: Always Encrypted performs enforcement by design: the database engine never sees plaintext for encrypted columns, so it inherently cannot leak it at runtime. There’s no additional policy check in SQL Server (it doesn’t need one – the encryption is enforced by the client driver). The “check” is effectively that the client driver will only decrypt data if it has the proper key. This is a form of runtime control, though not a dynamic policy – it’s baked into the architecture. An authorized application with the key will get plaintext (transparently), whereas any attempt to read data through other means yields ciphertext. There is no context-aware conditional access in the DB beyond that. (Newer secure enclave options allow certain computations on encrypted data within a trusted enclave, still without exposing plaintext to the DBA.)	No – Transparent/Passive: TDE does no extra runtime access checks beyond normal SQL permissions. If a query is allowed by the database’s standard ACL (Access Control List), TDE decrypts the data automatically. There is no additional “should this user be allowed to decrypt now?” evaluation – the decryption is fully transparent to the application/user. TDE runs within the DB engine, so if an attacker gains sufficient privileges or exploits a SQL injection to run a query, TDE will dutifully decrypt data for them as long as the request is seen as authorized by the DB. In short, TDE is not an active guard at runtime; it’s a background encryption that is invisible during normal operations.
Integration Effort & Performance Overhead	Low Effort, Low Overhead: Ubiq is designed for low/no-code integration with databases and applications. In a SQL Server scenario, it can be deployed via lightweight SDKs or plugins that handle encryption/decryption at the field level. This does not require major architectural changes – no database engine modification or heavy agent/proxy is needed. Developers or DBAs simply identify sensitive fields and use Ubiq’s API or library to transparently encrypt data on write and decrypt on read. Performance impact is minimal because Ubiq’s encryption is efficient and applied only to sensitive fields (not the entire DB). Network latency added by key retrieval or API calls is negligible with proper integration (keys can be cached securely, and crypto operations are fast). Real-world use shows Ubiq adding strong security with no noticeable slowdown.	Moderate Effort, Some Overhead: Implementing Always Encrypted requires client-side setup and potential application changes. Developers must use a supported Microsoft data driver (ODBC/OLE DB/.NET) that can handle encryption, and configure encryption for each target column. The application or client needs to be aware of which parameters and results are encrypted so that queries are written accordingly (e.g. parameterized queries for encrypted columns). Many SQL functions and operations (LIKE, JOIN on encrypted fields, range queries, etc.) are not supported or severely limited on encrypted data, which may require redesigning how the app queries data. This can be a significant integration effort in an existing app. Performance-wise, encryption/decryption happens on the client for each value, which adds CPU overhead and increases data transfer (ciphertext is typically larger than plaintext). Queries on encrypted data can’t use indexes effectively unless using deterministic encryption or enclaves, potentially reducing performance for lookup operations. In summary, Always Encrypted can impose modest latency and considerable development/testing effort, so it’s often used only for the most sensitive fields.	Built-in, Minimal Overhead: TDE is built into SQL Server and Azure SQL; enabling it is straightforward for DBAs (create a key/wallet, turn on encryption) with no code changes to applications. It operates at the I/O level, encrypting and decrypting pages as they are written/read from disk. As such, the performance impact is usually low (single-digit percent in most cases) and mostly on storage I/O. Applications see no difference in how they query data. Integration effort is minimal: it’s a configuration task and meets many compliance requirements out-of-the-box. However, TDE’s protection is limited to data-at-rest – it doesn’t address application-layer encryption needs. Operational overhead is low, though managing keys (wallets or integrating Azure Key Vault for BYOK) adds some administrative work.
Coverage of Data Types(structured DB data vs files/streams)	Broad: Ubiq’s platform can protect structured database data, as well as unstructured files and streaming data, with a single unified approach. Within SQL Server, Ubiq secures structured records at a fine grain (field level encryption/tokenization). Beyond that, the same Ubiq service can be used to encrypt data in application logs, data lakes, big data pipelines, or real-time streams – ensuring consistent data protection across the enterprise. This is useful if your organization has not only SQL databases but also files or NoSQL stores containing sensitive info. One platform covers it all.	Narrow (DB Columns Only): Always Encrypted is limited to structured data in SQL Server/Azure SQL databases. It only protects data within the database columns you configure it for. If that data is exported (e.g. to a CSV or a report) or moved to another system, it will be decrypted by the application and exist in clear unless additional measures are taken. AE does not apply to unstructured files or non-SQL data stores. (It does, however, encrypt data in transit to the database as a side benefit, since the data stays encrypted until it reaches the client). Outside of the database, other tools would be needed to protect the data (e.g. file encryption or application-layer encryption – which is essentially what Ubiq provides in a unified way).	Narrow (Database Only): TDE only encrypts data inside the database (and its backups). It covers the entire database or specific files, including full backups, so if someone steals the raw files, they can’t read them. But once data leaves the database (for example, an extract to a file, or data copied to another system), TDE no longer protects it. It does nothing for unstructured files on the OS, documents, or data in transit/streams. Those require separate encryption solutions (file system encryption, application-layer crypto, etc.). TDE’s coverage is essentially limited to protecting the stored database files and backup media.
Key Management	Externalized & Strong: Ubiq manages encryption keys in a secure, centralized service (with a FIPS 140-2 validated module). Key access is tied to IAM policies and never stored in the database. Typically, each data field or dataset can have its own key, and keys can be rotated regularly without changing the application code. Ubiq allows customer control over master keys (including bring-your-own-key integrations with cloud KMS/HSMs). Because the database server does not hold the keys, a compromise of the DB does not expose encryption keys – key release requires authenticating to Ubiq with the proper identity. This separation of duties means a DBA cannot extract keys from the DB (they reside only in Ubiq’s service or your KMS). Even if the database server is breached, an attacker can’t decrypt the data at will – they’d need to also breach the key service (which is heavily secured and governed by separate credentials).	External Column Keys: Always Encrypted uses a two-tier key model: Column Encryption Keys (CEKs) encrypt the data in the column, and Column Master Keys (CMKs) encrypt those CEKs. The CMK is stored externally (e.g. in Windows Certificate Store, Azure Key Vault, or an HSM) and never revealed to SQL Server. This means the master key lives outside the DB, providing a strong security boundary. The DBA cannot simply retrieve the key from the database. In Azure, one can store the CMK in Azure Key Vault and control access via Azure AD identities. However, the database does store the encrypted CEKs and uses them (via the client) to decrypt data, so if an attacker compromises the application or Key Vault (i.e. obtains the CMK and CEK), they could decrypt the data. Key management in Always Encrypted is robust against database-side threats (keys are separated from the DB), but it introduces the need to manage keys across systems (applications must have access to the keys or Key Vault). Key rotation requires careful planning (re-encrypting columns or using new keys) and application coordination. Overall, the keys are protected from DB insiders, but securing the client side and key store remains crucial.	Database Wallet or Key Vault: SQL Server TDE uses a Database Encryption Key (DEK) to encrypt the database, which is protected by a master key stored in a secure wallet or keystore. On-premises, this is often a certificate stored in the master database (or an HSM via Extensible Key Management); in Azure SQL, the master key is by default managed by the service, or it can be stored in Azure Key Vault for customer-managed keys (BYOK). This layered key approach prevents someone from directly reading keys from disk. However, since the database server needs the DEK in memory to function, a privileged admin or attacker who can access the server OS or the SQL process might extract the key or misuse it (for example, by copying the wallet or using the service’s privileges). Using an external Key Vault for TDE’s master key improves security (the key can be revoked, and the DB has to fetch it), but ultimately the DB engine uses the key automatically for any query. Thus, a malicious DBA who can run code on the server or who has access to the Key Vault credentials could potentially get the keys. In summary, TDE’s keys are well-protected against external theft (lost media), but not fully insulated from an insider with high privileges on the DB server.
Compatibility with IAM(Identity & Access Management integration)	Yes – IAM-Driven: Ubiq was built to integrate with enterprise identity providers (e.g. Okta, Azure AD). Data access policies are an extension of your existing IAM roles and rules. For example, if a user’s role or group in IAM no longer permits access to a certain data category, Ubiq will no longer release the decryption key for that data to that user. This provides consistent, centralized access control – the same identity management that controls application logins also governs data decryption rights. There is no separate user silo for the encryption system; it leverages SSO/MFA and role-based access already in place. This tight IAM integration means auditability (each decrypt is tied to an identity and logged) and dynamic control (access can be revoked in real-time via IAM).	Limited (Key Vault/AD Integration): Always Encrypted itself does not directly integrate with user IAM roles beyond the database context. It treats everyone who uses a given key the same. However, it can integrate with Azure AD for key management (when using Azure Key Vault for the Column Master Key). In that case, you can use Azure AD policies to control which applications or users can access the master key to decrypt data. This provides some integration with identity management at the key retrieval level. Still, SQL Server and the driver are not aware of the end-user’s identity – they only know if the key is available or not. Typically, the application using Always Encrypted manages data access per its business logic, but Always Encrypted won’t differentiate by user; it’s effectively on or off per column depending on if the app has the key. In summary, integration with corporate IAM is indirect and limited to the key store; it’s not an identity-aware policy enforcement at the data layer like Ubiq.	No (DB-centric only): TDE operates entirely within the database and has no integration with external identity management systems. Access to data is controlled by database logins and roles alone. There’s no concept of integrating Okta/Azure AD roles or user context into TDE’s operation – if a user can connect to the database and query a table (per DB permissions), TDE will decrypt the data for them. Key management can be tied to an enterprise Key Vault, but that is typically a static configuration and not tied to individual user identities at query time. Thus, IAM policies (like an Okta group revocation) do not directly affect who can see decrypted data in the database – only the database’s own privileges do, which are often broad for admins. In practice, TDE is completely identity-agnostic beyond the database user level.

Explanatory Notes and Key Insights

TDE: Compliance-Focused Encryption That Leaves Insider Gaps

Microsoft’s Transparent Data Encryption (TDE) is very effective for what it was designed for: protecting data at rest (on disk or backup media) from offline access. It’s like locking your database files in a safe. If someone steals the files or disks, they can’t read them without the key. This helps meet many compliance requirements (PCI-DSS, HIPAA, etc.) that mandate “encryption of data at rest.”

However, once the database is up and running, TDE provides no protection against anyone who can legitimately query the data. The data must be decrypted for the database to use it, so any user or service with read access (even DBAs or an attacker using stolen credentials) gets plaintext results. As one SQL Server expert summarized, “TDE is what you do for compliance but not actual security,” because it doesn’t stop interactive attacks.

If an insider DBA or a hacker with valid credentials executes a SELECT * on a sensitive table, TDE will happily return cleartext – the encryption might as well not exist in that moment. Microsoft’s documentation emphasizes that TDE alone is insufficient when you need to protect data from database administrators or in-memory attacks.

In real terms, TDE doesn’t limit who within the system can see data; it only ensures that if someone steals the physical files, they can’t read them. This is a common gap: breaches more often occur from compromised credentials or curious insiders (“front-door” access) rather than someone physically stealing drives.

In summary: TDE is necessary baseline encryption and great for compliance checkboxes, but it’s not designed to prevent an insider with DB access from viewing sensitive information. Organizations concerned about insider threats or active attackers must look beyond TDE for data protection in use.

Always Encrypted: Strong Data-in-Use Protection with Functional Trade-offs

Always Encrypted (AE) was introduced by Microsoft to address the very gap left by TDE: protecting data even when the database is running and even from high-privilege users. It achieves this by shifting encryption to the client side – the database server never sees the keys or the plaintext.

This provides a robust defense against a curious or malicious DBA, or a hacker who has gained control of the database: even with full DB admin rights, they can’t decrypt protected data through the database. In effect, AE creates a separation of duties between those who manage data and those who are allowed to see it.

This has real-world benefits: for example, if an attacker obtains sysadmin access to a production database, any column using AE (say, credit card numbers or SSNs) would be unreadable ciphertext, thwarting a breach. Even memory dumps of SQL Server won’t reveal those values, as they remain encrypted in memory.

Limitations

The trade-off is complexity and reduced database functionality. Since the database can’t decrypt or manipulate the data, many operations are restricted. Basic equality comparisons on encrypted data are possible (if using deterministic encryption), but you cannot perform range queries, LIKE searches, or calculations on encrypted columns unless you leverage workarounds like secure enclaves.

For example, you couldn’t easily ask the database for “all customers with age > 30” if the age column is encrypted – you’d have to fetch all ages and filter in the application or use enclave features in newer SQL versions.

Implementing AE may also require application code changes, driver configuration updates, and careful handling of query parameters. It’s not as effortless as turning on TDE. Because of these constraints, organizations usually deploy AE selectively for their most sensitive data (credit cards, SSNs, national IDs).

Microsoft has improved AE with Always Encrypted with Secure Enclaves (SQL Server 2019+), allowing certain computations on encrypted data within a secure enclave on the server. This mitigates some limitations, but AE remains a targeted solution for high-risk data rather than a broad encryption layer.

In summary: Always Encrypted provides real protection during runtime (something TDE cannot do), but at the cost of complexity and reduced DB flexibility. For the most critical data, AE is a powerful tool to thwart insider and in-memory attacks – or as one expert put it, “Always Encrypted is what you do for actual security (but not compliance).”

Ubiq’s Identity-Driven Encryption: Fine-Tuned Control and Broad Coverage

Ubiq’s data protection platform takes a data-centric approach similar in spirit to Always Encrypted – data is encrypted at the application level and remains encrypted in the database – but extends this with granular identity-based control and cross-environment flexibility.

The core idea: only the right identities, under the right conditions, ever see clear data, no matter where the data resides. Ubiq integrates with both your applications (via SDKs/APIs) and your IAM system, so that encryption and decryption are gated by policy checks against user or service identity.

For example, if a customer service app tries to decrypt a credit card number, Ubiq verifies that the request comes from an authorized service and role before returning plaintext. A DBA or admin running a direct query gets only encrypted tokens.

This approach enforces Zero Trust at the data layer – never trust the database or infrastructure by default, always verify identity and intent before decrypting.

Granularity and Least Privilege

Ubiq allows encryption down to individual fields and ties decryption rights to IAM roles. This enables true least-privilege access.

Example:

HR can view full salaries,
Finance sees masked versions,
DBAs see only ciphertext.

You can define rules like “show only last 4 digits of SSNs to support agents, but full SSN to managers with MFA.” Every decryption is logged with the user identity, creating detailed audit trails far beyond typical DB logging.

In short, Ubiq merges encryption and access control into one step: if you’re not the right user, the data stays encrypted.

Integration and Performance

Despite its depth, Ubiq’s model is developer-friendly. Integrations and APIs minimize code changes – developers mark fields as sensitive, and Ubiq handles encryption/decryption automatically. No proxies, agents, or schema changes are required.

Performance impact is negligible: encrypting a small field takes microseconds, and key lookups are optimized for high throughput. In contrast to AE, which can break queries, Ubiq supports flexible data handling, including format-preserving encryption and tokenization for partial searches or analytics compatibility.

Real-World Security Posture

Consider a breach scenario:

Scenario 1 – Insider Threat:

A DBA decides to exfiltrate customer data.
With TDE: succeeds (data in plaintext).
With AE: fails (data remains ciphertext).
With Ubiq: fails – even application access requires verified identity, and abnormal decrypt activity is logged or blocked.

Scenario 2 – External Attack: A hacker steals DB credentials.

With TDE: succeeds.
With AE: fails (no keys in DB).
With Ubiq: fails (keys stored separately, decryption requires identity context).
Ubiq adds anomaly detection: e.g., flagging when a service suddenly tries to decrypt thousands of records outside normal patterns. Neither TDE nor AE offers that.

Summary: Bridging Compliance and Real Security

TDE and Always Encrypted are often used together:

TDE covers compliance and baseline encryption at rest.
Always Encryptedprotects the most sensitive data from insiders.

Ubiq takes this further — providing in-use protection like AE, but without being tied to a single database. It unifies data protection across files, databases, and cloud services, while integrating directly with IAM.

As attackers increasingly exploit valid credentials and insider access, solutions like Ubiq and AE are critical. They separate query authorization from decryption authorization, ensuring that even legitimate users or services can’t access data they shouldn’t.

In practical terms: Adopting an identity-driven data protection model means that even if intruders get in, they can’t unlock what they’re not authorized to see. The focus shifts from protecting disks to protecting the data itself — the only approach that truly aligns with modern threat realities.

References

Microsoft documentation: Transparent Data Encryption (TDE) for SQL Server and Azure SQL Database
Microsoft documentation: Always Encrypted with secure enclaves
Buda Consulting: TDE vs Always Encrypted – What’s the difference?
Brent Ozar: Why TDE won’t stop an attacker (and Always Encrypted might)
Ubiq Security: Identity-Driven Data Protection Platform